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With A Broad Brush: The Federal
Regulation of Sanctions Against Burma
(Myanmar)t
By JAiMES FINCH,* DAVID SCHMAHMANN* ::: AND PATRICIA
BAILEY***
I. Introduction: Reason for and Goals of Sanctions
In September 1996, the U.S. Congress included in its Omnibus
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997 a threat of limited
economic sanctions against Burma The sanctions would be
implemented if the President discerned a deterioration in that
country's human rights record.2 In the original proposal, Kentucky
Republican Mitch McConnell and New York Democrat Daniel
Patrick Moynihan proposed a flat ban on all investments in
Myanmar' Concern that an absolute ban on investment would do
I In June 1989, the Government of Burma changed the country's name to the
Union of Myanmar and renamed the capital, formerly Rangoon, Yangon. Burma
Takes Another Name: Now, the Union of Myanmar, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 19S9, at A5.
The United States never recognized the change, and all references to the country in
its laws, executive orders and regulations are to "Burma." The names -Burma" and
"Myanmar" are used interchangeably throughout this Essay.
* Partner in the international law firm of Russin & Vecchi, Ltd. and resident
partner in Yangon, Myanmar.
** Partner in the Boston, Massachusetts law firm of Nutter, McClennen & Fish,
LLP.
*** Associate in the litigation department of Nutter, McClennen & Fish, LLP.
1. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-203, §
570, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
2. Sanctions would be applied upon a finding by the President that "the
Government of Burma has physically harmed, rearrested for political acts, or exiled
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi or has committed large-scale repression of or violence
against the Democratic opposition." See id. § 570(b).
3. Laurie Lande, Senate Votes Limited Sanctions Against Burma After
Lobbying, WALL ST. J., July 26,1996, at A9.
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more harm than good,4 however, led to a favorable vote in the Senate
on a compromise, the Cohen-Feinstein Amendment. The Cohen-
Feinstein Amendment is not an absolute ban on investment, but a
prohibition on future investment in Burma "resources."' The aim is
to prevent the disruption that might be caused by immediately forcing
all U.S. interests to withdraw from such projects as the Yadana
pipeline, the construction of which has resulted in significant
humanitarian efforts by U.S. investors.7 Instead, the ban is limited to
future investments.
In April 1997, the Secretary of State determined that the
sanctions should be enforced,8 and on May 20, 1997, President Clinton
issued an Executive Order prohibiting "new investment in Burma by
United States persons."9 Moreover, by reference to the "unusual and
extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the
United States" that Burma posed and a declaration of "national
emergency"'" in the United States, the President invoked the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)1' to
threaten criminal sanctions against those who might violate his
Order."
There is no explanation in the Executive Order as to how the
situation in Burma could be construed as creating a national
4. 142 CONG. REc. S8745-47 (daily ed. July 25, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Feinstein).
5. The Cohen-Feinstein Amendment softened the McConnell proposal by
making sanctions inapplicable to investments that occurred prior to the application of
sanctions. The Cohen-Feinstein Amendment also allows humanitarian and counter-
narcotics assistance. See id. at S8746 (statement of Sen. Cohen).
6. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act § 570(b).
7. See 142 CoNG. REC. S8745-47.
8. MYANMAR, ASEAN Governments Denounce U.S. Sanctions Action, 14 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 79 (Apr. 30,1997).
9. Exec. Order No. 13,047,62 Fed. Reg. 28,301 (May 20, 1997).
10. Id.
11. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1998).
12. Pursuant to IEEPA section 1705, once the President declares a national
emergency, penalties may be imposed for violations of licenses, ordes or regulations
issued under IEEPA. Specifically, any person who violates or attempts to violate any
license, order or regulation issued under IEEPA may be fined up to $10,000. Id. §
1705(a). In addition, any entity that "willfully violates, or willfully attempts to
violate" any license, order or regulation issued under IEEPA, if corvicted, shall be
fined up to $50,000. If that entity is a person, that person also may be imprisoned for
up to ten years. See id. § 1705(b). Likewise, any officer, director or agent of any
corporation who knowingly participates in such a violation may be punished by fine,
imprisonment or both. Id.
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emergency in the United States. In his press release to Congress in
connection with the Order, however, the President stated:
I believe that the actions and policies of the SLORC' regime
constitute an extraordinary and unusual threat to the security and
stability of the region, and therefore to the national security and
foreign policy of the United States. 4 It is in the national security
and foreign policy interests of the United States to seek an end to
abuses of human rights in Burma and to support efforts to achieve
democratic reform progress on these issues would promote regional
peace and stability and would be in the political, security, and
economic interests of the United States.5
The President's Executive Order authorized the Secretary of the
Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to promulgate
regulations. On May 21, 1998, the Office of Foreign Assets Control
of the U.S. Treasury Department (OFAC) issued its "Burmese
Sanctions Regulations, 16 which attempt to carry out the objectives of
the Order.17
While the Cohen-Feinstein Amendment and Executive Order
prohibit "new investment" in "the economical development of
resources located in Burma," neither provides specifics as to the
scope of this proscription." Though the Regulations purport to do so
and provide a number of illustrations and explanations, they leave
several questions open. This Essay examines how far the Regulations
extend and predicts the types of "new investment" that are prohibited
13. At the time of the Executive Order, the military government of Burma was
called the State Law and Order Council (SLORC). As of November 15, 1997, the
name of the government changed to the State Peace and Development Council
(SPDC).
14. It is virtually impossible to provide an objective basis for alleging that
Myanmar is a threat to the security and stability of the region. The country's
economy, tiny even by regional standards, has been virtually isolated since the early
1960s. Burma is not alleged to export terrorism and is a member of the Association
of South East Asian Nations. The country, moreover, maintains good relations with
neighboring nations. Without claiming that a U.S. national emergency exists,
however, the President cannot invoke IEEPA or the threat of criminal sanctions.
15. 143 CONG. REc. S4746 (daily ed. May 10, 1997) (report of the Executive
Order Prohibiting New Investment in Burma-Message from the President).
16. Burmese Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 537 (1998).
17. See id.; see also Exec. Order No. 13,047, 62 Fed. Reg. 28,301. § 6 (May 20,
1997).
18. What constitutes "new investment" is confusing. For example, would
increasing an existing investment constitute a "new investment"? Should the
definition of "resources" be interpreted rather narrowly as "natural resources" or on
a much broader basis? These issues are discussed infra.
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by U.S. individuals and corporations in Burma.
The value of unilateral economic sanctions by the United States
has, of late, been a topic of hot debate in the world's capitals.
Proponents argue that unilateral economic sanctions are a risk free
way to send a message to countries that do not comply with U.S.
wishes in areas such as human rights but do not merit military
action. 9 Opponents argue such sanctions infuriate allies, hurt U.S.
economic interests and are ineffective."'
Neither the Cohen-Feinstein Amendment, Executive Order nor
Regulations explain how the sanctions will lead to improvements in
human rights in Burma. There are two logical possibilities of how
sanctions may help. First, the sanctions could cause the Burmese
leadership to adopt policies more in line with U.S. preferences.
However, there is no evidence that this is a reasonable expectation.2
Second, economic pain caused by the sanctions could cause the
Burmese people to rise up against the government. The country has
existed, however, in virtual economic isolation since the early 1960s.
There is no current evidence to support the proposition that the
sanctions are effecting Burma's economy, making the expectation of
an uprising unrealistic. The position of the Burmese government is
that U.S. investment in Burma was insignificant before the sanctions
and was simply replaced by other countries when the United States
imposed sanctions.2'
H. Description of the Sanctions
The basic prohibition on U.S. investment is consistent
throughout the Cohen-Feinstein Amendment, Executive Order and
Regulations. It is a ban on "new investment" by a "United States
person" after May 21, 1997, "if such an activity is undertaken
pursuant to an agreement.., with the Government of Burma or a
nongovernmental entity in Burma" and if such an agreement
includes:
19. Lexington, The Many-Handed Mr. Eizenstat, ECONOMIST, Jan. 24, 1998, at 30.
20. Id.; see also Richard Haass, Sanctions Almost Never Work, ASIAN WALL ST.
J., June 29, 1998, at 12.
21. SLORC Shrugs Off Sanctions, BANGKOK POST, Apr. 24, 1997.
22. Ernest H. Preeg, Myanmar (Burma): Case Study in Unilateral Sanctions, in
FEELING GOOD OR DOING GOOD? A CRITIQUE OF UNILATERAL ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS (manuscript on file with author). Examples include: 1) the purchase of
Texaco's interest by Petronas, the Malaysian State oil company; and 2) the
replacement by Japanese competitors of Apple computer.
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(a) The entry into a contract that includes the economic
development of resources located in Burma;
(b) The entry into a contract providing for the general supervision
and guarantee of another person's performance of a contract
that includes the economic development of resources located in
Burma;
(c) The purchase of a share of ownership, including an equity
interest, in the economic development of resources located in
Burma; or
(d) The entry into a contract providing for the participation in
royalties, earnings, or profits in the economic development of
resources located in Burma, without regard to the form of
participation.23
Also prohibited by the Executive Order and Regulations, but not
the Cohen-Feinstein Amendment, is "any approval or other
facilitation by a United States person or any person wherever located,
of a transaction by a foreign person where the transaction would
constitute prohibited new investment in Burma if engaged in by a
United States person or within the United States."" In addition, the
Cohen-Feinstein Amendment, Executive Order and Regulations
prohibit the sale of shares or equity in the development of resources
in Myanmar. "
The above prohibitions are subject to the exception that the
entry into, performance or financing of a contract to sell or purchase
goods, services or technology is permissible. Also, "economic
development of resources located in Burma" is not considered by the
Regulations to include non-profit educational, health or other
humanitarian programs or activities.:
23. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-203. §
570(f)(2), 110 Stat. 3009 (1996); Burmese Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 537.303
(1998); 62 Fed. Reg. 28,301, § 3 (May 20,1997).
24. See 31 C.F.R. § 537.202; 62 Fed. Reg. 28.301, § 2(a).
25. See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act § 570(f)(2)(B); 62 Fed. Reg.
28,301, § 3(d)(iii).
26. IML § 570(1).
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MI. Analysis of the Regulations
A. Resources
The Cohen-Feinstein Amendment's prohibition on "new
investment"'' in "the economical development of resources located in
Burma" appears, on its plainest reading, to extend to natural
resources such as oil, gas, timber and minerals. This interpretation is
bolstered by an awareness of the vast potential for Burma and foreign
investors in the exploitation of Burma's forests, minerals and energy
resources,2S the heavy concentration of investment in these sectors2g
and government involvement in investments undertaken by
foreigners in these potentially lucrative sectors."' That the resources
must be "located in Burma" suggests, as a matter of grammar, both
that they must already exist in some form and they must be physically
located within Burma's borders. The effect of those prohibitions on
the U.S. economy and investors is discussed in Part IV below.
In contrast to the Cohen-Feinstein Amendment, the Executive
Order and Regulations give an expansive definition to the term
"resources." Under the Order, "resources located in Burma," means
any resource, including natural, agricultural, commercial, financial,
industrial and human resources, located within the territory of
Burma, including the territorial sea, or located within the exclusive
economic zone or continental shelf of Burma. 1  Likewise, the
Regulations define "resources" to include "natural, agricultural,
commercial, financial, industrial, and human,"32 leaving little room for
any investment that is not, ultimately, in a "resource.33
27. See discussion infra Part III.B.
28. See, e.g., MINISTRY OF NATIONAL PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT,
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF
MYANMAR 20-25 (1996); INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CENTER,
MULTINATIONAL BUSINESS IN BURMA (MYANMAR), 16-18 app.G (1997).
29. Id.
30. For example, see Union of Myanmar Foreign Investment Law, 1988, State
Law and Order Restoration Council Law No. 10/88 (as amended) and State-Owned
Economic Enterprises Law section 3 (1989), which exclude certain sectors of the
economy, principally those relating to natural resources, from foreign investment
absent a demonstration to the Myanmar government that such investment will be in
the State's best interest. To some extent, a quid pro quo for such a determination
may include a measure of government control or participation.
31. 62 Fed. Reg. 28,301, § 4(e).
32. Burmese Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 537.311 (1998).
33. Exceptions to the sanctions are discussed infra Part III.G and enumerated in
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The broad extension of "resource" by the Executive Order and
Regulations from the original definition in the Cohen-Feinstein
Amendment raises an issue of obvious concern. In addition to the
basic examples of oil, gas and timber mentioned in the Regulations as
prohibited economic development of resources located in Burma,4
acquiring land and running a hotel or factory on the land are included
in the Regulations' definition as well." It is utterly unclear from the
Regulations, however, whether these activities are prohibited because
the "resource" was the land or, as suggested by the broad definition
of the term in the Regulations, because the "resource" was the
activity on the land. It is thus impossible to tell whether, under the
Regulations, investment in a hotel or factory would be permissible if
it did not involve the acquisition of land. Obviously, this vagueness
discourages (minus any exceptions discussed below) any investment
in Burma.
The Regulations extend, somewhat unfairly, to Burmese
the Regulations separately from the prohibition on investing in resources.
34. 31 C.F.R § 537.403. Although a judge might consider limiting the wording of
the Cohen-Feinstein Amendment to the plain reading of the concept of "'resources,"
the courts in construing the Regulations would give the legislation due deference and
respect, which would probably result in the Regulations being upheld. See
O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 530 (1933) (stating that the departments
of the government should be kept completely independent of one another "in the
sense that the acts of each shall never be controlled by, or subjected, directly or
indirectly, to the coercive influence of either of the other departments"); sce also In
re SBRA Case No. 39576, 912 P.2d 614, 623 (Idaho 1995) (stating that legislation is to
be given due deference and respect by court); Idaho State AFL-CIO v. Leroy, 718
P.2d 1129, 1136 (Idaho 1986) ("In the absence of a legislative invasion of
constitutionally protected rights, the judicial branch of government must respect and
defer to the legislature's exclusive policy decisions.").
After declaring a national emergency, the President must consult with Congress
before exercising any of his authorities under IEEPA. See 50 U.S.C. § 1703(a)
(1991). Specifically, the President must immediately transmit a report to Congress
specifying the circumstances of the situation, why the situation constitutes an
"unusual and extraordinary threat," the authorities and actions to be taken, vhy the
actions are necessary and the foreign countries involved. Id. § 1703(b). In addition,
the President must report to Congress every six months on the actions taken and any
changes that occur concerning the information initially provided to Congress. See id.
§ 1703(c). The President may issue regulations "as may be necessary" for the
exercise of his authorities under IEEPA. See id. § 1704.
35. 31 C.F.R § 537.403.
36. As an additional illustration in connection with the concept of "facilitation,"
the Regulations mention investment in "a tourist hotel complex" as impermissible.
Id. § 537.409(b)(1). Similar to the illustrations discussed above, it is not clear
whether the impermissibility comes as a result of the fact that a hotel complex,
amounts to an investment in land, which is a resource, or whether the hotel itself
constitutes a resource. See id. § 537.409(b).
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employees of U.S. companies, and it would seem to prohibit even the
sharing of job-related skills with them. For example, section 537.408
makes it illegal to train Burmese citizens in machine repair, except in
connection with the sale of such machines if the training would be
"considered the purchase of employment services which is exempt
from prohibition."' Neither the language of the Cohen-Feinstein
Amendment nor its legislative history suggest such a broad and
punitive reach of the prohibition.' In determining whether the broad
gloss applied by OFAC is sustainable, a court would defer to the
agency's interpretation of the Cohen-Feinstein Amendment and
Executive Order, but not without limitation. 9
37. Id. § 537.402(3).
38. It is, of course, a well settled principal of law that "[tjhe interpretation
expressly placed on a statute by those charged with its administratio7n must be given
weight by the courts faced with the task of construing the statute." Zemel v. Rusk,
381 U.S. 1, 11 (1964).
Furthermore, the President's expansive reading of the language of the Cohen-
Feinstein Amendment probably would be given presumptive weight by a court. In
appraising the argument that an Act of Congress does not contain sufficiently
definite standards for the formulation of implementing action by the Executive, the
U.S. Supreme Court stated:
It is important to bear in mind . .. that because of the changeable and
explosive nature of contemporary international relations, and the fact that
the Executive is immediately privy to information which cannot be swiftly
presented to, evaluated by, and acted upon by the legislature, Congress-in
giving the Executive authority over matters of foreign affairs-must of
necessity paint with a brush broader than it customarily wields in domestic
affairs:
Practically every volume of the United States Statutes contains one or
more acts or joint resolutions of Congress authorizing action by the
President in respect of subjects affecting foreign relations, which either
leave the exercise of power to his unrestricted judgment, o provide a
standard far more general that that which has always been considered
requisite with regard to domestic affairs.
Id. at 17 (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 229 U.S. 304,324 (1936)).
39. In Chevron v. Natural Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837,843-44 (1984), the Court
stated:
[I]f a statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the
question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute. 'The power of an administrative
agency to administer a congressionally created ... program necessarily
requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left,
implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.' [citation omitted] If Congress has
explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of
authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by
regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless
they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.
One cannot say that the President and OFAC's expansive reading of phrase
[Vol. 22:323
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The Regulations, in theory, embody the explicit exception in the
Cohen-Feinstein Amendment, permitting the sale or purchase of
"goods, services or technology,"" but they simultaneously encumber
any person actually attempting to sell or buy in Burma with
potentially crippling restrictions. For example, a person subject to the
Regulations may sell or purchase in Burma but may not open or
operate a new showroom, office or branch' He may not expand his
business by opening additional facilities nor build any structure to
house his business, since the building would constitute "economic
development of land and commercial resources in Burma."2'
Arguably, these OFAC restrictions largely vitiate the intent of
Congress not to hobble existing U.S. business that would provide the
infrastructure and market share should the time come when business
with Burma is again encouraged.43 The examples given by the
Regulations imply that development of commercial and economic
resources is ipso facto impermissible.' In short, a plain reading of the
definition of "resources" in the Regulations suggests that investing in
a hotel or factory would be considered investing in resources
"economical resources located in Burma" is "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute." In addition, it is probably true that the President is invested
with sufficient power in foreign affairs to legitimately expand the definition
regardless of the scope of the Cohen-Feinstein Amendment. See LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, §§ 4-3, at 213,4-4, at 219 (1988).
40. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-203, §
570(f), 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
41. Burmese Sanctions Regulations 31 C.F.R § 537.408(1) (1998).
42- Id. § 537.408(2).
43. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. S8749 (daily ed. July 25, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Johnson opposing a total ban on economic activity in Burma and in support of the
more limited measure that was ultimately adopted):
[T]his (the question of comprehensive economic sanctions against
Burma) is a difficult question. No one defends the SLORC, the group that is
running Myanmar, or Burma.... The question is: would it be effective to
do what Senator McConnell has proposed? ... Would it help achieve the
end? Mr. President, I think it would do precisely and exactly the opposite.
Mr. President, to cut off American participation in Burma-not foreign
participation but American participation-would be exactly the wrong thing.
First of all, it is no sanction because Americans are less that 10 percent of
foreign investment in Burma today....
And the question is: Is it good to have an American company, or would
it be better to have Total, the French company, have the contract? Really
that is the question proposed by the McConnell approach. I submit that it is
better to have an American company there.
44. 31 C.F.R. § 537.408.
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regardless of the real estate interests involved.45 It is not clear that
this is what Senators Cohen, Feinstein and supporters of the
compromise had in mind. 6 In fact, the testimony surrounding the
amendment suggests that several Senators who voted in favor of the
Cohen-Feinstein Amendment did so, not because of any commitment
to all-encompassing sanctions, but to defeat the more draconian
proposal by Senators McConnell and Moynihanf
B. New Investment
The prohibition against "new investment" in the Executive
Order is defined by the Regulations as activities pursuant to
agreements entered into with "the Government of Burma or a
nongovernmental entity in Burma.... "' "Nongovernmental entity
in Burma" is defined as:
A partnership, association, trust, joint venture, corporation, or
other organization, wheresoever organized, that is located in
Burma or exists for the exclusive or predominant purpose of
engaging in the economic development of resources located in
Burma or derives its income predominantly from such economic
development, and is not the Government of Burma.49
It may be inferred from the foregoing that contracts with
individuals in Myanmar would not be prohibited as "new investment"
because individuals' are neither the government of Myanmar nor a
nongovernmental entity as defined above."1  There is no reason
provided in the Regulations for this exception.
Thus, the Regulations appear to permit the purchase of shares by
U.S. persons "in the economic development of resources located in
45. In general, foreigners, foreign companies and Myanmar companies with one
or more shares owned by foreigners are prohibited by the Transfer of Immovable
Property (Restriction) Law, Pyithu Hluttaw Law No. 1 (1987), from purchasing real
estate in Myanmar in fee interests or in lease agreements for more than one year.
Joint ventures with the Myanmar government are exempt from this restriction.
46. See 142 CONG. REc. S8746 (daily ed. July 25, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Cohen).
47. 142 CONG. REC. S8748 (daily ed. July 25,1996) (statement of Sen. Thomas).
48. Burmese Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 537.308 (1998).
49. Id. § 537.309.
50. It is assumed here that the individuals in question are not acting on behalf of
or in any capacity for the government of Myanmar.
51. See Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
§ 570(f)(2), 110 Stat. 3009 (1996); see also Exec. Order No. 13,047, 62 Fed. Reg.
28,301, § 4(d) (May 20, 1997).
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Burma" from individuals, since the Regulations only prohibit the
purchase of such shares "directly or indirectly from the Government
of Burma or a nongovernmental entity in Burma
Nongovernmental entity, as "entity" is defined in the Regulations,
does not include individuals.!
After the effective date of the Regulations, May 21, 1997,2 with
fairly narrow exceptions, no new investment in economic resources
located in Burma was permitted. Existing investments may remain,
though they are subject to considerable constraints:f5 contractual
obligations "specifically contemplated in [a] pre-effective date
agreement" may be fulfilled; shares in Burmese companies
purchased or agreed to be purchased prior to the effective date may
continue to be held;" and persons subject to the Regulations may
continue to hold shares in an entity that "subsequently engages
exclusively or predominantly" in prohibited activities within Burma,
although they may not purchase additional shares.
C. Nationality of Investor
The prohibition against new investment covers "United States
persons," defined as U.S. citizens, permanent resident aliens, U.S.
companies and personsP9 located in the United States. The
nationality of the companies from which the above mentioned equity
would be prohibited for U.S. persons to purchase is vague. The
Regulations would, on their face, apply to equity in any company
engaging in the economic development of resources in Myanmar, no
matter how small a project is in size or in proportion to the company's
total activities. The Regulations have a separate prohibition for
investment in shares of third-country companies; the purchase of
shares in companies located in third countries whose profits are
predominately derived from the economic development of resources
52. 31 C.F.R. § 537.404.
53. Id. § 537.303.
54. See iL § 537.302.
55. See supra text accompanying notes 27 and 28.
56. Burmese Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R1 § 537A07(c) (1998). The obvious
effect of this exemption is that if an agreement was entered into before May 21, 1997
for an investment in Burmese resources, the agreement is -grandfathered" and not
affected by the Regulations.
57. See id. § 537.404.
58. See i. § 537A05(b).
59. It is unclear whether this includes both natural and juridical persons.
60. 31 C.F.R § 537.314.
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located in Myanmar is prohibited.61 It may also be inferred, therefore,
that the absolute prohibition on the purchase of equity in which there
is any investment in the development of resources in Myanmar
applies only to the purchase of equity in companies registered in
Myanmar.
The rule mentioned above62 is applicable to companies registered
in third countries63 that invest in the development of resources in
Myanmar. If a U.S. person already holds shares in a third-country
company and that company changes its investment such that its
profits predominately come from the economic development of
resources in Myanmar, the U.S. person is not required to divest itself
of the shares but may not acquire further shares in that company.f If
the U.S. person wants to sell its shares in the company, it may do so
without running afoul of the prohibitions against "facilitation"
mentioned above.65
The practical effect of the foregoing is that U.S. persons need
only avoid purchasing shares in companies registered in third
countries if the company's profits are predominately derived from the
economic development of resources in Myanmar at 'the time the
shares are purchased. If a U.S. person owns shares in a non-U.S.,
non-Myanmar company that decides to invest in Myanmar, and even
later receives all of its profits from Myanmar, the U.S. person may
continue to hold those shares.'
61. Id. § 537.405(a).
62. Namely that the U.S. person is prevented from investing if the company's
profits are predominately derived from the economic development of resources in
Myanmar under 31 C.F.R. section 537.405(a).
63. Third-country companies refer to companies not registered in the U.S. or in
Myanmar.
64. If a U.S. person holds shares in an entity that subsequently engages
exclusively or predominantly in the economic development of resources located in
Burma or subsequently derives its income exclusively or predominantly from such
economic development, that U.S. person is not required to relinquish his shares, but
may not purchase additional shares. Divestment of shares in such an entity to a
foreign person-constituting the facilitation of that foreign person's investment in
Burma-is authorized under a general license pursuant to 31 C.F.R. section 537.504.
Burmese Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 537.405(b) (1998).
65. Id.
66. Id. § 537.203 entitled "Evasions; Attempts; Conspiracies" statc s:
Except to the extent provided in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses
that may be issued pursuant to this part, any transaction by a United States
person or within the United States that evades or avoids, or has the purpose
of evading or avoiding, or attempts to violate, any of the prohibitions set
forth in this part is prohibited.
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D. Purchase of Debt
The Regulations do not prohibit U.S. persons from purchasing
debt. Debt instruments of the Myanmar government or Myanmar
companies may be purchased as long as the instruments are not
convertible into equity and the U.S. person does not have to
participate, even as collateral, in royalties, earnings or profits.'" The
obvious intent of proscribing such convertibility is to prevent
investors from structuring equity investment, otherwise prohibited, so
that it appears to be debt.
E. Profit Sharing
The Cohen-Feinstein Amendment and Executive Order"'
anticipate some prohibition on the formation of contracts for
participation in royalties, earnings or profits in companies engaged in
economic development of resources in Myanmar. The restriction
appears in the Regulations in connection with the debt instruments
discussed above, subcontracts to provide goods, services or
technology discussed beloxv0 and in the definition of new
investment.7'
F. Guarantees
The Regulations prohibit a U.S. person from entering into a
contract providing for the general supervision and guarantee of
another person's performance of a contract that includes the
economic development of resources located in Myanmar. It is
explained in the Regulations, however, that only contracts at the top
level of management-for example, entry into a contract with a
development project's sponsor or owner to become a main contractor
or general manager-would be considered a violation of this
prohibition. Contracts for goods, services or technology to main
contractors are excepted as long as: 1) the functional scope of the
contract is not substantially similar to that of the main contractor's
67. Id. § 537.404.
68. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-203, §
570(f)(2)(C), 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
69. Exec. Order No. 13,047,62 Fed. Reg. 28,301, § 4(d)(iv) (May 20,1997).
70. Burmese Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 537.406(b), 537AQS(a)(2)(ii)
(1998).
71. Id. § 537.308(d).
72. Id § 537.406.
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contract, or 2) the consideration for the contract is not shares in
ownership, royalties, earnings or profits.' A logical reading of the
prohibition's limitation to the top level of management combined
with the examples is that all contracts, not just those for goods,
services and technology,74 would be permissible as long as they did not
violate the two qualifications above.
G. Contracts to Sell or Purchase Goods Services or Technology
As mentioned above, entry, performance or financing of a
contract to sell or purchase goods, services or technology is permitted
under the Regulations, except in the following situations:
(1) Where the entry into a contract on or after the effective date is
for the general supervision and guarantee or anothor person's
performance of a contract for the economic development of
resources located in Burma; or
(2) Where such contract provides for payment, in whole or in part,
in:
(i) Shares of ownership, including an equity interest, in
the economic development of resources located in
Burma; or
(ii) Participation in royalties, earnings, or profits in the
economic development of resources located in
Burma.75
Interestingly, this list of impermissible acts and omissions in
connection with goods, services and technology does not cover entry
into a contract that also includes the economic development of
resources located in Myanmar. Would the exemption therefore
enable a U.S. person to enter into a contract for the economic
development of resources located in Myanmar as long as the contract
also included provisions on goods, services or technology? Although
this question is certainly logical, examples provided with the rule
suggest the opposite. This absent language may provide a defense to
sanctions for a U.S. person who invests in what otherwise would be
considered a prohibited investment but includes goods, services or
technology, thus exempting it from the reach of sanctions.
73. See id. § 537.406(a), (b).
74. Contracts for goods, services and technology would be protected separately
under 31 C.F.R. section 537.204.
75. Id. § 537.408(a)(1).
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The examples provide two interesting exceptions to the
Regulations' prohibitions. First, contracts for the registration and
renewal of patents, trademarks and copyrights are acceptable. ' This
means that U.S. persons may take necessary steps to protect
intellectual property rights in Myanmar. Second, U.S. banks are
allowed to provide trade financing to the Myanmar government and
nongovernmental entities in Myanmar, but they may not provide
loans earmarked for economic development of resources if
repayment is secured by the project itself.C A U.S. bank may,
moreover, provide development project financing if the loan is not
convertible to equity and does not provide for participation in
royalties, earnings or profits in the economic development of
resources in Myanmar.' These exceptions seem to embody one
aspect of the reasoning advanced by some Senators in the hearings
surrounding the adoption of the Cohen-Feinstein Amendment,
namely that U.S. business interests should be harmed as little as
possible by the Regulations. Thus, while U.S. investment is
constrained, some exceptions, like that for goods, services and
technology contracts, are permitted."r
H. Licenses
The OFAC may issue licenses to individual applicants to engage
in acts that would otherwise constitute violations of the Regulations:'
Licenses may be granted, however, only if the President makes a
determination that enforcing the relevant sanction would be contrary
to the national interest and certifies this to Congress.P
IV. Effects and Problems for U.S. Political and Economic
Interests
Unilateral sanctions are now the tool of choice for U.S. foreign
policy. Since the end of World War I, the United States has imposed
such sanctions 115 times. Incredibly, sixty-one of those have been
during the Clinton Administration!- Today, over seventy-five
76. Id. § 537.408(b)(4).
77. Id. § 537.40S(b)(5).
78. Id.
79. Id § 537.409(a)
80. Id. § 537.502.
8L Id. § 537.201 note.
82. David S. Broder, Sanctions Addicts, WASH. PosT, June 24,1998, at A17.
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countries-constituting over two-thirds of the world's population-
are subject to U.S. sanctions for various reasons, inclu ding weapons
proliferation, human rights violations, drugs, terrorism, armed
aggression against other countries, environmental issues and limits on
market access."
During the Cold War, containing communism was done with
force or the threat of force. Most foreign policy problems since the
break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, however, have not been
contained in similar ways.' Unilateral economic sanctions have the
advantage of appearing to take a decisive step without necessarily
requiring retaliation, much less force, from recipient countries.
The effects of the Cohen-Feinstein Amendment, Executive
Order and Regulations are difficult to gauge, given the simultaneous
effects of government mismanagement, the general culoff of foreign
aid to Burma and the Asian financial crisis.' Several obvious effects,
however, have emerged. By isolating Burma, the United States is
pushing Burma into the arms of China. The Chinese government is
immensely interested in having Burma in China's political orbit
because Burma is strategically located and capable of giving China
access to the Bay of Bengal. One of the cornerstones of Western
foreign policy in Southeast Asia is to provide a strong balance to
China's influence in the region.' In spite of this, local cbservers note
that China's political influence in Myanmar has increased in recent
months. India has, moreover, recently complained of collaboration
between China and Myanmar at an intelligence gathering.
The U.S. share of imports to Myanmar is only two or three
percent. U.S. imports to other Southeast Asian countries are about
fifteen percent. This discrepancy results in a loss of between US$200
million and $300 million in sales of U.S. goods to Myanmar.' A more
serious issue is a long term one: the fact that U.S. industry is now
almost totally absent from Myanmar. When U.S. companies are
eventually allowed to invest in Myanmar, other countries will already
have a decisive foothold in the economy, and the United States may
not be able to compete for decades. In arguing the relatively small
impact of the sanctions, the government of Myanmar repeatedly cited
83. Haass, supra note 20, at 12.
84. Lexington, supra note 19, at 30.
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the fact that U.S. interests, minimal to begin with, were immediately
bought out by non-U.S., foreign investors."
One effect of the U.S. sanctions is the removal of flexibility from
the President in dealing with the Burmese government. The
Administration may not lift the sanctions unilaterally but must wait
for Congress to do so.' It is unlikely, given the fact that there is little
organized opposition to the sanctions from voters, that Congress will
bother to lift the sanctions for some time.
Finally, the affront created by the U.S. sanctions has practically
eliminated the United States as an ongoing influence in Myanmar on
such issues as human rights and the control of narcotics. The effect is
that the advice and counsel of the U.S. government-often a
moderating influence in the developing world-has been, to a large
degree, ignored in Yangon since the implementation of sanctions.
V. Conclusion
Now that the Regulations are in effect, it is up to history to sort
out the role they wxill play in the complex political situation
transpiring in Myanmar. As a practical matter, negative publicity in
the United States caused the withdrawal of nearly all U.S. business
interests in Myanmar prior to the issuance of the Regulations.)' The
Regulations constitute a significant step in the imposition of
economic sanctions on Myanmar; they further isolate Burma from the
influence of U.S. diplomats, members of the Administration and
business people. Although the short-term economic impact of the
sanctions on the United States is small, the effects of U.S. absence
from the economic scene in lyanmar may take generations to heal.
88. Id.
89. Burmese Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R1 § 537.201 (1998).
90. As of April 22, 1997, U.S. investment in Burma, mostly in oil and natural gas
development, was worth approximately $240 million. See Mark Felsenthal,
Sanctions: Clinton Orders Burma Sanctions: New Foreign Investment Banned, 14 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 942 (May 28,1997). On August 20,1997, the military government
in Burma claimed that foreign investment in the country rose despite the U.S. ban on
new investment. Specifically, a report in the official New Light of Myanmar
newspaper stated that foreign investment increased four hundred percent, and
investment from Burmese citizens increased eight hundred percent in 1996-1997. In
Brief, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 146S (Sept. 3, 1997). However, published figures
from Myanmar question this assertion. Figures released by Burma's Ministry of
National Planning and Economic Development indicated that foreign investment
only increased by six percent in 1996-1997. Foreign Investment: Figures from Burma
Cast Doubt on Official's Claims of Increase, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1550 (Sept.
17,1997).

